On the origins of a Conflict of Interest in the Mutual Fund Industry

Sebastien Lemeunier

No WP1102, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: This article discusses conflicts of interest existing between investors and their financial advisors. Several contributions in this field treated this question in relation either with invested amount or with expected holding period of the mutual fund. Our paper considers an approach globalizing these two parameters. The first part describes the organization of mutual fund fees in the US. Thanks to a numerical simulation, the second part emphasizes the conflict of interest focusing on the expected holding period. The third one analyses the changes of variables and their consequences on characteristics of investors concerned by this conflict of interest.

Keywords: Mutual funds; Broker Dealer; Regulation; conflict of interest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 G24 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2010-08-01
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http://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/59/21/08/PDF/WP1102.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On the Origins of a Conflict of Interest in the Mutual Fund Industry (2011)
Working Paper: On the origins of a Conflict of Interest in the Mutual Fund Industry (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-11002

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