EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Fear of novelty: a model of scientific discovery with strategic uncertainty

Damien Besancenot () and Radu Vranceanu ()

No WP1503, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientiÖc potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholarsí ability to properly assess the scientific value of new ideas.

Keywords: Economics of science; Scientific discovery; Strategic complementarity; Strategic uncertainty; Global games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C72 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mfd, nep-mic and nep-sog
Date: 2015-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01117929/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: FEAR OF NOVELTY: A MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY WITH STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Fear of novelty: a model of scientific discovery with strategic uncertainty (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-15003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School ESSEC Research Center, BP 105, 95021 Cergy, France. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sophie Magnanou ().

 
Page updated 2019-11-18
Handle: RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-15003