Interest Rates and Investment Under Competitive Screening and Moral Hazard

Anastasios Dosis

No WP1902, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of (market) interest rate changes on investment under competitive screening and moral hazard. Lower (higher) rates ease (hinder) the provision of incentives to entrepreneurs with positive NPV projects to invest in their best project but hinder (ease) banks' efforts to distinguish them from entrepreneurs with negative NPV projects. This might result in a hump-shaped investment curve. Under low rates, screening through limit pricing leaves insufficient profits to low-wealth entrepreneurs to invest in their best project, and consequently, several project qualities might co-exist in equilibrium. Several testable and other implications on the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy to boost investment are discussed.

Keywords: Interest rates; Entrepreneurial wealth; Investment; Competitive screening; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E30 E44 E58 G01 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2019-02
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Working Paper: Interest Rates and Investment Under Competitive Screening and Moral Hazard (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-19002

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