Random walks and voting theory

Nicolas Vieille ()

No 753, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: Voters' preferences depend on the available information. Following Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced from the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary, as soon as a winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new result on random walks.

Keywords: voting theory; quotas; random walks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2002-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Related works:
Working Paper: Random Walks and Voting Theory (2004)
Working Paper: Random Walks and Voting Theory (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0753

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