Random Walks and Voting Theory

Nicolas Vieille ()

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Abstract: Voters' preferences depend on available information. Following Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced from the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary, as soon as a winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new result on random walks.

Keywords: voting theory; majority vote; random walk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02-01
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Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2004, Vol.29,n°1, pp.106-113. ⟨10.1287/moor.1030.0052⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Random walks and voting theory (2002)
Working Paper: Random Walks and Voting Theory (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464928

DOI: 10.1287/moor.1030.0052

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