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On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects

Stefano Lovo, Gian Luigi Albano and Fabrizio Germano ()
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Gian Luigi Albano: ELSE and Department of Economics, University College London

No 765, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects: the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) and the the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We first derive a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the JAMO by exploiting the strategic equivalence between the JAMO and the Survival Auction which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Then, we prove that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO do not have a counterpart in the JAMO. However, it is shown that certain collusive equilibria based on retaliatory strategies do exist in both auctions.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; Ascending auctions; FCC auctions; Collusion; Retaliation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2002-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects (2002)
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