On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects
Gian Luigi Albano and
Fabrizio Germano ()
Working Papers from HAL
We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects: the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) and the the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We first derive a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the JAMO by exploiting the strategic equivalence between the JAMO and the Survival Auction which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Then, we prove that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO do not have a counterpart in the JAMO. However, it is shown that certain collusive equilibria based on retaliatory strategies do exist in both auctions.
Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; Ascending auctions; FCC auctions; Collusion; Retaliation.; Retaliation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in 2002
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Working Paper: On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00593867
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