EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects

Stefano Lovo, Gian Luigi Albano and Fabrizio Germano ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects: the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) and the the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We first derive a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the JAMO by exploiting the strategic equivalence between the JAMO and the Survival Auction which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Then, we prove that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO do not have a counterpart in the JAMO. However, it is shown that certain collusive equilibria based on retaliatory strategies do exist in both auctions.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; Ascending auctions; FCC auctions; Collusion; Retaliation.; Retaliation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00593867
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Published in 2002

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects (2002) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00593867

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2022-09-17
Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00593867