Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games

Nicolas Vieille () and Eilon Solan ()

No 772, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive some terminal payoff.

We study a variant of this model, where the order by which players are chosen is deterministic, and the probability that the game terminates once the chosen player decides to stop may be strictly less than one.

We prove that a subgame-perfect e-equilibrium in Markovian strategies exists. If the game is not degenerate this e-equilibrium is actually in pure strategies.

Keywords: n-player games; stopping games; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C68 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2003-01-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games (2003)
Working Paper: Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games (2003)
Working Paper: Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games (2003)
Working Paper: Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0772

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