Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games

Nicolas Vieille () and Eilon Solan ()

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Abstract: A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive some terminal payoff. We study a variant of this model, where the order by which players are chosen is deterministic, and the probability that the game terminates once the chosen player decides to stop may be strictly less than 1. We prove that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in Markovian strategies exists. If the game is not degenerate this ε-equilibrium is actually in pure strategies.

Keywords: Dynkin game; Stochastic game; Equilibrium; n-player games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-11-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003, Vol.39,n°8, pp.911-929. ⟨10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00021-1⟩

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Journal Article: Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games (2003)
Working Paper: Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games (2003)
Working Paper: Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games (2003)
Working Paper: Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464953

DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00021-1

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