Regulating Water an Sanitation Network Services. Accounting for Institutional and Informational Constraints

Daniel Camos and Antonio Estache

Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: The main purpose of this chapter is to argue that the optimal design of regulation of water and sanitation monopolies should be the outcome of a detailed diagnostic of the institutional constraints impacting the ability of the operator - whether public or private - to deliver the services.Tailoring the regulatory processes and instruments to account for institutional and informational weaknesses stands a better chance of improving the performance of the sector than the adoption of imported standardized or pre-packaged regulatory tools.

Pages: 37 p.
Date: 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published by:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/2522 ... TACHE-regulating.pdf Full text for the whole work, or for a work part (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/252274

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... lb.ac.be:2013/252274

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().