Regulating water and sanitation network services accounting for institutional and informational constraints

Daniel Camos and Antonio Estache

No 8149, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to argue that the optimal design of regulation of water and sanitation monopolies should be the outcome of a detailed diagnostic of the institutional constraints impacting the ability of the operator -- whether public or private -- to deliver the services. Tailoring the regulatory processes and instruments to account for institutional and informational weaknesses stands a better chance of improving the performance of the sector than the adoption of imported standardized or pre-packaged regulatory tools.

Keywords: Town Water Supply and Sanitation; Small Private Water Supply Providers; Water Supply and Sanitation Economics; Water and Human Health (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-07-18
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Related works:
Working Paper: Regulating Water an Sanitation Network Services. Accounting for Institutional and Informational Constraints (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:8149

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