Official dollarisation/euroisation: motives, features and policy implications of current cases
Adalbert Winkler,
Francesco Mazzaferro,
Carolin Nerlich and
Christian Thimann
No 11, Occasional Paper Series from European Central Bank
Abstract:
Official and unilateral dollarisation/euroisation has become a common policy advice for emerging market economies. Against this background, the paper provides a comprehensive review of all the main cases of dollarisation/euroisation, analysing motives, features and policy implications of this exchange rate regime. The main results are that policies fostering integration with the anchor country, in particular fiscal transfers, tourism and offshore finance, have been crucial in supporting the exchange rate regime. To this end, most dollarised/euroised countries have exploited advantages that are largely prior to the choice of exchange rate regime, namely their small size, geographic proximity to the anchor country, and politically dependent status. Thus, recommending dollarisation/euroisation irrespective of countries’ ex ante degree of integration with the potential anchor country seems to bear considerable risks, as dollarisation/euroisation does not seem to be a straightforward substitute for integration.
Keywords: dollar; euro (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02
Note: 501437
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp11.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbops:200411
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Occasional Paper Series from European Central Bank 60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Official Publications ().