Governance of securities clearing and settlement systems

Daniela Russo, Terry L. Hart, Maria Chiara Malaguti and Chryssa Papathanassiou

No 21, Occasional Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: In the context of securities clearing and settlement systems, the nature of governance arrangements acquires a dimension that goes beyond their traditional function in corporate law. They constitute a tool for regulators and central banks to achieve their respective policy goals relating to market operation, market integrity, and systemic stability. In the light of the analysis of this paper, and pending a further evolution in the regulation of securities clearing and settlement in the Community, the following conclusions can be drawn. Whatever the model of corporate governance used in a jurisdiction, securities clearing and settlement systems should adopt and ensure effective implementation of the highest corporate governance standards or best practices adopted or recommended for companies in the jurisdiction in which it operates as such standards or practices evolve over time. Generally, this would imply that securities clearing and settlement systems at minimum should adopt and implement the best practices recommended for listed companies. JEL Classification: G29, G34, L49, K2

Keywords: clearing; governance; oversight; risk management; settlement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11
Note: 552524
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (57)

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