The disciplining effect of supervisory scrutiny in the EU-wide stress test

Christoffer Kok, Carola Müller, Steven Ongena and Cosimo Pancaro

No 2551, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: Using a difference-in-differences approach and relying on confidential supervisory data and an unique proprietary data set available at the European Central Bank related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. JEL Classification: G11, G21, G28

Keywords: banking regulation; banking supervision; credit risk; internal models; stress testing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-eec and nep-rmg
Note: 508948
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The disciplining effect of supervisory scrutiny in the EU-wide stress test (2023)
Working Paper: The Disciplining Effect of Supervisory Scrutiny in the EU-Wide Stress Test (2022)
Working Paper: The disciplining effect of supervisory scrutiny in the EU-wide stress test (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20212551

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