Security Analysis, Agency Costs, and UK Firm Characteristics

John Doukas (), Phillip J. McKnight and Christos Pantzalis
Additional contact information
Phillip J. McKnight: Cardiff Business School
Christos Pantzalis: University of South Florida

No 65, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 from Royal Economic Society

Abstract: This paper assesses the monitoring power of security analysts from the manager-shareholder conflict perspective. Using a sample of UK firms tracked by security analysts, our evidence supports the view that security analysis acts as a monitoring mechanism in reducing agency costs. We also find that security analysts are more effective in reducing agency costs for smaller and more focused firms rather than larger and more diversified firms suggesting that for larger and more complex firms security analysis is less effective. The UK findings suggest that the monitoring role of security analysts is not restricted to the U.S. capital market environment.

Date: 2002-08-29
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.org/res2002/Doukas.pdf full text

Related works:
Journal Article: Security analysis, agency costs, and UK firm characteristics (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:ac2002:65

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().