Strategic delays of delivery, market separation and demand discrimination
Sebastien Mitraille and
Eric Avenel ()
No 155, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society
We show that an adequate choice of delays to deliver a durable good allows a monopoly to reduce competition between his two retailers on two different markets. Instead of preventing each retailer from selling on both markets, the producer separates the markets by directing the choices of consumers between the retailers. The consumer whose willingness to pay is the lowest obtains the good later than the other, and both pay their highest valuations for the good: the producer perfectly discriminates the demand. The European car market where producers try to restrict competition between retailers is an application of our findings.
Keywords: delivery delays; discrimination; market separation; vertical restraints; European car market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L22 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Strategic Delays of Delivery, Market Separation and Demand Discrimination (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:ac2003:155
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