Details about Sebastien Mitraille
Access statistics for papers by Sebastien Mitraille.
Last updated 2020-08-10. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pmi823
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Working Papers
2017
- Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment
Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance 
See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (2020)
2015
- Speculative Constraints on Oligopoly
Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance View citations (1)
2012
- Evaluation of the Risks of Collective Dominance in the Audit Industry in France
IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 
Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2011) View citations (1) TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2012)
- Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly
TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 
Also in IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse (2011)  IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse (2012)  LERNA Working Papers, LERNA, University of Toulouse (2012)  TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2011) 
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (2013)
2008
- Monopoly Behaviour with Speculative Storage
Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance 
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2009)
- The Costs and Benefits of "Strangers": Why Mixed Communities Are Better
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK View citations (2)
2007
- Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Hierarchy in Two-Period Cournot Oligopoly
IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse View citations (1)
Also in LERNA Working Papers, LERNA, University of Toulouse (2007) View citations (1)
2004
- Storage Behaviour Of Cournot Duopolists Over The Business Cycle
Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004, Royal Economic Society View citations (4)
- Strategic Delays of Delivery, Market Separation and Demand Discrimination
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK 
Also in Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003, Royal Economic Society (2003)
2003
- Private label, quality choice and bargaining power in a vertical structure
Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse), French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse)
Journal Articles
2020
- Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment
Economic Theory, 2020, 69, (3), 789-828 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper (2017)
2015
- The costs and benefits of coordinating with a different group
Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 160, (C), 517-535 View citations (9)
2014
- Speculative storage in imperfectly competitive markets
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2014, 35, (C), 44-59 View citations (7)
2013
- Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two‐Period Cournot Oligopoly
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2013, 22, (4), 852-874 View citations (9)
See also Working Paper (2012)
2009
- Monopoly behaviour with speculative storage
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2009, 33, (7), 1451-1468 View citations (15)
See also Working Paper (2008)
2003
- Comportements microéconomiques de stockage et de vente à terme état de l'analyse économique
Revue d'économie politique, 2003, 113, (5), 649-669 View citations (1)
Chapters
2012
- Testing for the Presence of a Maverick in the French Audit Industry
Chapter 4 in Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, 2012
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