Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly
Sebastien Mitraille and
Michel Moreaux
No 11-249, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Abstract:
Two-period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nash- perfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leader- ship over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains, obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting from increased competition and higher operation costs. This number and the industry inventories are non monotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and competition increase due to the strategic use of inventories.
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
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Related works:
Journal Article: Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two‐Period Cournot Oligopoly (2013) 
Working Paper: Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly (2012) 
Working Paper: Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly (2012) 
Working Paper: Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly (2012) 
Working Paper: Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly (2011) 
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