Matching and Price Competition

Jeremy I. Bulow and Jonathan Levin
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Jeremy I. Bulow: Stanford U

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We develop a model in which firms set their salary levels before matching with workers. Wages fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise almost as much, implying little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed. We explore the performance of alternative institutions and discuss the recent antitrust case against the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results.

Date: 2003-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1818.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Matching and Price Competition (2006)
Working Paper: Matching and Price Competition (2005)
Working Paper: Matching and Price Competition (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:1818

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