Matching and Price Competition

Jonathan Levin and Jeremy Bulow

No 350, Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: We develop a model in which firms set their salary levels before matching with workers. Wages fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise almost as much, implying little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed. We explore the performance of alternative institutions and discuss the recent antitrust case against the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results

Keywords: matching; auctions; market design; wage competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D43 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Matching and Price Competition (2006)
Working Paper: Matching and Price Competition (2005)
Working Paper: Matching and Price Competition (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nawm04:350

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