Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Generic Payoffs

Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson ()

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies (admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and dependence only on the game's normal form even when embedded in a larger game with redundant strategies or irrelevant players (small worlds). The axioms are satisfied by a set that is stable (Mertens, 1989) and conversely the axioms imply that each selected set is stable and thus an essential component of admissible equilibria with the same outcome.

Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:2000

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