Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment
Michael Ostrovsky and
Michael Schwarz
Additional contact information
Michael Schwarz: Yahoo! Labs
Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
Abstract:
We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, following the introduction of new reserve prices revenues in these auctions have increased substantially.
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-ict and nep-mkt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)
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http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2054.pdf
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Journal Article: Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment (2023) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:2054
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