Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment

Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz

Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 131, issue 12, 3352 - 3376

Abstract: We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, revenues increased substantially after the new reserve prices were introduced.

Date: 2023
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Related works:
Working Paper: Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment (2009)
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