Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations
Eric Weese ()
Working Papers from Yale University, Department of Economics
Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.
JEL-codes: C63 D71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations (2015)
Working Paper: Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:yaleco:113
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