Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations

Eric Weese

Working Papers from Yale University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.

JEL-codes: C63 D71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/file ... rs/wp100/ddp0113.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Working-Papers/wp100/ddp0113.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Working-Papers/wp100/ddp0113.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations (2015)
Working Paper: Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations (2013)
Working Paper: Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:yaleco:113

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Yale University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().