Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations

Eric Weese

Working Papers from Economic Growth Center, Yale University

Abstract: Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.

Keywords: boundaries; mergers; moment inequalities; municipalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 D71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2013-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp1022.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations (2015)
Working Paper: Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations (2013)
Working Paper: Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:egc:wpaper:1022

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