Partisan Goals and Electoral Interests: Brazilian Economic Reforms under Lula

Maria Carolina da Silva Leme and Tomás Málaga

No 178, Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: Almost everyone was surprised by the reforms proposed by the Lula administration in Brazil. Once in power, they proposed reforms they voted against when in opposition. We analyze a game in which political parties, with partisan and electoral interest, try to approve reforms that benefit the majority of population but face an opposition with substantial power to determine their fate. The Opposition’s behavior may lead to different equilibrium: approval of the reform after an electoral cycle, with the party initially against the reform making it their own; not approval, with the parties taking turn in power; not approval, with the party that originally proposed the reform remaining in power, but with the deterioration of the economic situation

Keywords: Economic Reforms; Electoral Interest; Partisan Interest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:latm04:178

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