Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions

Aloisio Araujo and Luciano de Castro

No 300, Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy equilibrium with an exogenous and explicit tie breaking mechanism. As a basis for these results, we obtain a characterization lemma that is valid under a general setting, that includes non-independent types, asymmetrical utilities and any attitude towards risk. Such characterization gives a basis for an intuitive interpretation for the behavior of the bidder: to bid in order to equalize the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of bidding

Keywords: auctions; pure strategy equilibria; non-monotonic bidding functions; tie-breaking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:latm04:300

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