The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation

Parkash Chander

No 108, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is, it is the final and not the immediate payoffs that matter to the coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of the gamma-characteristic function, and that the grand coalition is the only stable coalition structure.

Keywords: strategic games; coalition formation; farsighted; core; characteristic function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.15639.1074153497.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The gamma-core and coalition formation (2007)
Working Paper: The gamma-core and coalition formation (2007)
Working Paper: The [gamma]-core and coalition formation (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:108

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