Competitive Equilibria and the Core of Exchange Economies under Asymmetric Information

Geoffroy de Clippel

No 174, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: I argue in favor of a competitive screening approach for studying the question of coalition formation in exchange economies under asymmetric information. I obtain a new notion of core that refines Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is nonempty under the standard regularity conditions. I also justify a notion of competitive equilibrium formerly introduced by Wilson as a technical tool for proving the nonemptiness of the coarse core. Indeed, the core converges to the set of Wilson equilibria when the economy is replicated

Keywords: Competitive equilibria; Core; Competitive Screening; Asymmetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D5 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:174

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