Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments

Alexander Matros

No 295, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: We consider two-round elimination tournaments where players have fixed resources instead of cost functions. Two approaches are suggested. If the players have the same resources and a success function is stochastic, then players always spend more resources in the first than in the second round in a symmetric equilibrium. Equal resource allocation between two rounds takes place only in the winner-take-all case. However, if the players have independent private resources and the success function is deterministic, then every player spends at least one third of his resources in the first round. The players spend exactly one third of their resources in the winner-take-all case. Applications for career paths, elections, and sports are discussed

Keywords: Tournaments; auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-spo
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http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.21815.1075415055.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:295

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