Nonparametric Estimation of Dutch and First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction Models with Asymmetric Bidders

Harry Paarsch and Bjarne Brendstrup

No 39, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: Within the independent private-values paradigm, we demonstrate nonparametric identification of Dutch and first-price, sealed-bid auction models when bidders are asymmetric. We also demonstrate that, in the presence of a binding reserve price, methods for estimating the distribution of valuations from data at Dutch auctions differ from those at first-price, sealed-bid auctions. The differences are illustrated by comparing the kernel-smoothed nonparametric estimators for each auction format

Keywords: asymmetric Dutch auctions; nonparametric estimation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:39

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