Constitutional Rules
Francesco Giovannoni and
Toke Aidt
No 540, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society
Abstract:
This paper proposes a normative theory of constitutional rules. We characterize the set of optimal constitutional rules under different assumptions about the degree of contractual imperfections. Our model explains why constitutions contain different types of rules. In particular, we derive conditions under which it is optimal, in addition to a standard decision rule (e.g., simple majority), to introduce veto rules (that block certain types of decisions) and supermajority rules (that allow the veto rule to be overruled). Our model also explains the existence of amendment rules and checks and balances
Keywords: Constitutions; constitutional design; social contracts; majority rules; amendments; checks and balances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D D70 H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.25897.1075585313.pdf (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:540
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