Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

Smorris and Takashi Ui

No 45, Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. First, this paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. Next, it shows that the sufficient conditions generalize the existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria

Keywords: potential functions; equilibrium selection; robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria (2005)
Working Paper: Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria (2003)
Working Paper: Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nawm04:45

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