Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui

No 1394, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions and shows that the sufficient conditions generalize the existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria.

Keywords: Incomplete information; Potential; Refinements; Robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2003-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pke
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (2005), 124: 45-78

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Related works:
Journal Article: Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria (2005)
Working Paper: Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria (2004)
Working Paper: Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria (2003)
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