Markets with Simultaneous Signaling and Screening

Roman Inderst

No 614, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society

Abstract: We model markets with adverse selection as matching markets. In a given match the informed or the uniformed party is chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. This allows to account for the simultaneous presence of signaling and screening. Moreover, the possibility to dissolve matches unsuccessfully allows to endogenize the distribution of types in the market. It will be shown that this approach overcomes the well-known trade-off between ensuring existence (in signaling games) and obtaining clear-cut results (in screening games).

Date: 2000-08-01
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