Successful Uninformed Bidding

Angel Hernando-Veciana ()

No 791, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society

Abstract: This paper studies multiunit common value auctions with informed and less informed bidders. We show that bidders with less information can bid very aggressively and do surprisingly well in terms of probability of winning and expected revenue. We also show that the degree of aggressiveness and success of bidders with less information is positively related to the number of units for sale. We explain these phenomena in terms of the balance of the winner's curse and the loser's curse and their differential effect on bidders with different quality of information.

Date: 2000-08-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Successful uninformed bidding (2004)
Working Paper: SUCCESSFUL UNINFORMED BIDDING (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0791

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