SUCCESSFUL UNINFORMED BIDDING

Ángel Hernando Veciana ()
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Ángel Hernando Veciana: Universidad de Alicante
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Angel Hernando-Veciana ()

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multiunit auction in which some bidders are better informed than others. We show that bidders with worse information can do surprisingly well: They can win with higher probability than better informed bidders, and sometimes, even with higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success of worse informed bidders and the number of units for sale. Finally we argue that the correct intuitive explanation of these results relies on the balance of the winner's curse and the loser's curse effects.

Keywords: asymmetric bidders; common value; winner¿s curse; loser¿s curse. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2001-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published by Ivie

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2001-06.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2001 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Successful uninformed bidding (2004)
Working Paper: Successful Uninformed Bidding (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2001-06

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