Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work
Jan Boone and
Jan van Ours ()
No 973, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society
We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also macro-spillover effects from the additional creation of vacancies, which originates from the increased effectiveness of labor supply. We advocate that for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate.
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Working Paper: Modelling Financial Incentives To Get Unemployed Back To Work (2000)
Working Paper: Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work (2000)
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