Modeling Financial Incentives to Get the Unemployed Back to Work

Jan Boone and Jan van Ours

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2006, vol. 162, issue 2, 227-252

Abstract: We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. We find that benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across-the-board reduction in the replacement rate, for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed. We decompose the effects of a sanction system into micro, crowding-out, spillover, and tax effects.

JEL-codes: H55 J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Modelling Financial Incentives To Get Unemployed Back To Work (2000)
Working Paper: Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work (2000)
Working Paper: Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work (2000)
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