Experimentación y estructura de mercado en la relación de licencia de patentes no drásticas (I). El caso de información simétrica

Manel Antelo

No 1, Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica from IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia

Abstract: We analyze the dynamics of the (non-drastic) patents which last for several periods when its owner is asymmetrically informed in relation to their users. These learn -by using the patent- its cost characteristics, and there is symmetric information among the users. In this setting, we show that the trade off between the sampling effect and the dissipation effect determines the patent efficient allocation from the market viewpoint. We also show that the incentive compatibility problem in some contracts -those which are based on the users information- precludes sometimes the patent owner to implement efficient allocations. Finally, it is shown that, from the social viewpoint, a duopoly in each production period is the optimal market structure to be generated. As a consequence, a patent length reducing policy is always a welfare improving measure.

Keywords: (Non-drastic) Patents with Experimentation; Endogenous Market Structure; Symmetric and Asymmetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Experimentación y estructura de mercado en la relación de licencia de patentes no drásticas (II). El caso de información asimétrica (1996)
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