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Colonialism, Elite Formation and Corruption

Luis Angeles () and Kyriakos C. Neanidisy

No 2010-51, SIRE Discussion Papers from Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE)

Abstract: This paper argues that corruption in developing countries has deep historical roots; going all the way back to the characteristics of their colonial experience. The degree of European settlement during colonial times is used to dfferentiate between types of colonial experience, and is found to be a powerful explanatory factor of present-day corruption levels. The relationship is non-linear, as higher levels of European settlement resulted in more powerful elites (and more corruption) only as long as Europeans remained a minority group in the total population.

Date: 2010
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