Colonialism, elite Formation and corruption

Luis Angeles () and Kyriakos Neanidis

Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow

Abstract: This paper argues that corruption in developing countries has deep historical roots; going all the way back to the characteristics of their colonial experience. The degree of European settlement during colonial times is used to differentiate between types of colonial experience, and is found to be a powerful explanatory factor of present-day corruption levels. The relationship is non-linear, as higher levels of European set- tlement resulted in more powerful elites (and more corruption) only as long as Europeans remained a minority group in the total population.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Colonialism, Elite Formation and Corruption (2010)
Working Paper: Colonialism, Elite Formation and Corruption (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gla:glaewp:2011_02

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