Candidate location and endogenous valence
EERC Working Paper Series from EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS
This paper analyzes the effect that the ability of candidates to increase their valence has on candidate location in the Downsian model of elections. I show that if the candidates can increase valence at a cost after they have selected policy, then the candidates will select different policy platforms in order to avoid spending too much on valence. I then consider the factors that determine the degree of divergence, the amount spent on valence, and the location of the indifferent voter.
Keywords: Russia; valence; policy divergence; candidate equilibrium; median voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://eercnetwork.com/default/download/creater/w ... 07209ff7daceef1c.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to eercnetwork.com:443 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eer:wpalle:05-17e
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, 92/94, Dmytrivska Str., suite 404, Kyiv, 01135 Ukraine
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in EERC Working Paper Series from EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, 92/94, Dmytrivska Str., suite 404, Kyiv, 01135 Ukraine.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anton Pashchenko ().