Effective risk aversion in thin risk-sharing markets
Constantinos Kardaras and
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
We consider thin incomplete financial markets, where traders with heterogeneous preferences and risk exposures have motive to behave strategically regarding the demand schedules they submit, thereby impacting prices and allocations. We argue that traders relatively more exposed to the market portfolio tend to behave in a more risk tolerant manner. Noncompetitive equilibrium prices and allocations result as an outcome of a game among traders. General sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of such equilibrium are provided, with extensive analysis of two-trader transactions. Even though strategic behavior causes inefficient social allocations, traders with sufficiently high risk tolerance and/or high initial exposure to tradable securities obtain more utility gain in the noncompetitive equilibrium, when compared to the competitive one.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium; effective risk aversion; noncompetitive risk sharing; price impact; thin markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F3 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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Published in Mathematical Finance, 1, October, 2020, 30(4), pp. 1565 - 1590. ISSN: 0960-1627
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Journal Article: Effective risk aversion in thin risk‐sharing markets (2020)
Working Paper: Effective risk aversion in thin risk-sharing markets (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:102275
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