Effective risk aversion in thin risk-sharing markets
Constantinos Kardaras and
Papers from arXiv.org
We consider thin incomplete financial markets, where traders with heterogeneous preferences and risk exposures have motive to behave strategically regarding the demand schedules they submit, thereby impacting prices and allocations. We argue that traders relatively more exposed to market risk tend to submit more elastic demand functions. Noncompetitive equilibrium prices and allocations result as an outcome of a game among traders. General sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of such equilibrium are provided, with an extensive analysis of two-trader transactions. Even though strategic behaviour causes inefficient social allocations, traders with sufficiently high risk tolerance and/or large initial exposure to market risk obtain more utility gain in the noncompetitive equilibrium, when compared to the competitive one.
Date: 2017-07, Revised 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Effective risk aversion in thin risk‐sharing markets (2020)
Working Paper: Effective risk aversion in thin risk-sharing markets (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1707.05096
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