Relational contracts: recent empirical advancements and open questions

Rocco Macchiavello and Ameet Morjaria

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Relational contracts – informal self-enforcing agreements sustained by repeated interactions – are ubiquitous both within and across organizational boundaries. This review highlights recent empirical contributions in selected areas. We begin by reviewing some recent work that explicitly takes the dynamic enforcement constraints that underpin relational contract theory to the data. We then discuss the relationship between relational contracting and firms’ performance. We conclude by pointing in directions that we consider to be particularly ripe for future work.

Keywords: contract theory; organizations; relational contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2023-11-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 30, November, 2023, 179(3-4), pp. 673 - 700. ISSN: 0932-4569

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/123003/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions (2023)
Working Paper: Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions (2023)
Working Paper: Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:123003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().