Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions

Rocco Macchiavello and Ameet Morjaria

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2023, vol. 179, issue 3-4, 673-700

Abstract: Relational contracts - informal self-enforcing agreements sustained by repeated interactions - are ubiquitous both within and across organizational boundaries. This review highlights recent empirical contributions in selected areas.We begin by reviewing some recent work that explicitly takes the dynamic enforcement constraints that underpin relational contract theory to the data. We then discuss the relationship between relational contracting and firms' performance. We conclude by pointing in directions that we consider to be particularly ripe for future work.

Keywords: relational contracts; contract theory; organizations; relationalcontracts; contracttheory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 F14 L14 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions (2023)
Working Paper: Relational contracts: recent empirical advancements and open questions (2023)
Working Paper: Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions (2023)
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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0048

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