Effects of individual incentive reforms in the public sector: the case of teachers

Pedro Martins and João Ferreira

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Can incentive schemes deliver value in the public sector, despite major principal-agent challenges? We evaluate a reform that introduced individual teacher performance-related pay and tournaments in public schools in Portugal, despite trade union opposition. We find evidence that the focus on individual performance decreased student achievement (as measured by national exams) and increased grade inflation. The results follow from a difference-in-differences analysis of matched student-school panels and two complementary control groups (including private schools). Students with a higher proportion of teachers exposed to tournaments also perform worse. Overall, our results highlight the social costs of disrupting workers’ cooperation, a possible unintended consequence of public-sector tournaments.

Keywords: matched school-student data; merit pay; public sector; tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 I28 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2025-01-31
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Published in Public Choice, 31, January, 2025. ISSN: 0048-5829

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/127285/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Effects of individual incentive reforms in the public sector: The case of teachers (2024)
Working Paper: Effects of Individual Incentive Reforms in the Public Sector: The Case of Teachers (2024)
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