Managing persuasion robustly: the optimality of quota rules

Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan and Yingkai Li

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study a sender-receiver game in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. We ask how the receiver should commit, in advance, to a rule that maps the information of the sender into decisions-when the receiver knows neither the sender’s true preferences nor the full range of information the sender could supply. To handle this dual uncertainty, we adopt a unified robust framework that nests max-min utility, min-max regret, and min-max competitive ratio as special cases. Across all criteria, the same answer emerges: the optimal rule is always a quota rule.

Keywords: communication; commitment; partial alignment; quota rules; min-max regret; max-min utility; competitive ratio (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2026-09-30
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 30, September, 2026, 236. ISSN: 0022-0531

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