Optimal life cycle asset allocation: understanding the empirical evidence

Alexander Michaelides and Francisco J. Gomes

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We show that a life-cycle model with realistically calibrated uninsurable labor income risk and moderate risk aversion can simultaneously match stock market participation rates and asset allocation decisions conditional on participation. The key ingredients of the model are Epstein–Zin preferences, a fixed stock market entry cost, and moderate heterogeneity in risk aversion. Households with low risk aversion smooth earnings shocks with a small buffer stock of assets, and consequently most of them (optimally) never invest in equities. Therefore, the marginal stockholders are (endogenously) more risk averse, and as a result they do not invest their portfolios fully in stocks.

JEL-codes: F3 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (302)

Published in Journal of Finance, April, 2005, 60(2), pp. 869-904. ISSN: 1540-6261

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/193/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Life‐Cycle Asset Allocation: Understanding the Empirical Evidence (2005)
Working Paper: Optimal Life-Cycle Asset Allocation: Understanding the Empirical Evidence (2005)
Working Paper: Optimal life-cycle asset allocation: understanding the empirical evidence (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:193

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